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WHY NAFTA VIOLATES THE CANADIAN
CONSTITUTION
AvI GESSER*
I.

INTRODUCTION

With the proliferation of international economic treaties over the
last decade, many of the traditional hallmarks of state sovereignty continue to erode. Each new round of negotiations on transnational economic integration, such as those surrounding the Multilateral Agreement on Investment' and the creation of the World Trade Organization
("WTO"),2 challenges the very constitutional structures of the negotiating parties. As the states of the European Union have learned, many of
the benefits of cross-border economic integration cannot be realized
without relinquishing some of the old characteristics of independent
statehood. In many instances, the new economic order requires significant reinterpretation of (or outright judicial amendment to) national
constitutions. 3 This same dilemma now faces the countries of North
America: what conflicts exist between their international trade obligations created by treaty and their national constitutions and how will
these incongruities be resolved?
In December 1992, the governments of Canada, the United States,
L.L.M. New York University, 1998; L.L.M. Cambridge University, 1995; L.L.B. University of Manitoba, 1994; B.S.c. University of Manitoba, 1981. I thank Professors Thomas
Franck, Bryan Schwartz and the late Butch Nepon for their assistance in preparing this
article. The author is currently practicing law in New York City.
1. Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Consolidated Text and Commentary, Negotiating Group on the MAI, Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs, Organization
for
Economic
Cooperation
and
Development,
OECD
Doc.
DAFFEMAI(97)1/REV2 (May 14, 1997); see also Multilateral Agreement on Investment:
Report of the MAI NegotiatingGroup, OECD Doc., Annex (May 21, 1997).
2. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol.
1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
3. See cases in which national courts of European Union countries have adopted the
supremacy of European law, even where the state's constitution suggests otherwise: Internazionale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle fir Getreide und Futtermittel, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] 37, 271
(1974) (F.R.G.), [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 540 (1974); SpA Granital v. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato, Corte costituzionale [Corte cost.] [Italian Constitutional Court], 8 jun.
1984, n.170, Guir. It. 1984, I, 1521, [1984] 21 C.M.L.R. 756 (1984) (Italy); Case 213/89,
Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport ex Parte Factortame, Ltd., [House of Lords]
1990 E.C.R. 1-2433, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 1 (1990) (Gr. Brit.).
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and Mexico signed the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA"),4 creating a North American trading bloc. NAFTA was designed to phase out tariffs and establish a free market framework between the signatories. Its objectives include eliminating barriers to
trade, promoting conditions of fair competition, increasing investment
opportunities, and establishing procedures for the resolution of dis5
putes.
Since NAFTA was signed, several articles have been written on the
compatibility of certain NAFTA obligations with the national constitutions of the signatory states. Primarily, the debate has focused on
whether the Articles of NAFTA which allow countries to settle certain
trade disputes before Binational Panels violate the American 6 or Mexican constitutions.7 In addition to the significant academic debate, this
issue has generated two formal proceedings in the United States Federal Courts challenging the constitutional validity of NAFTA on the basis that the Chapter 19 Binational Panels process amounts to an unconstitutional relinquishment of sovereign powers. 8 Although these
challenges did not succeed, the controversy has not been resolved. Despite the legal activity in the United States, thus far the issue of the
consistency between NAFTA obligations and the Canadian Constitution
has not generated much interest. However, two recent legal decisions
may spark interest in this issue north of the 49th parallel.
Part of the reason that NAFTA has not been challenged in Canada
is that public sentiment has not reached the level of animosity regard4. North American Free Trade Agreement, Oct. 7, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M.
289 (1993) & 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFrA].
5. Id. art. 101.
6. See Ethan Boyer, Article I1, the Foreign Relations Power, and the Binational
Panel System of NAFTA, 13 INT'L TAX AND BUS. LAW 101 (1995); Denis J. Edwards,
NAFIA and Article III. Making a Drama Out of a Crisis, NAFTA: LAW & BUS. REV. AMS.,
vol. 1, No. 2, 69 (1995); Demetrios G. Metropoulos, ConstitutionalDimensions of the North
American Free Trade Agreement, 27 CORNELL INT'L. L.J. 141 (1994); Gregory W. Carman,
Resolution of Trade DisputesBy Chapter 19 Panels: A Long-Term Solution or Interim Procedure of Dubious Constitutionality,21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1 (1997); Bruce Ackerman &
David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1995); Laurence H.
Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-FormMethod in Constitutional Interpretation,108 HARV. L. REV. 1221 (1995).
7. Luis Manuel Perez de Acha, BinationalPanels:A Conflict of Idiosyncrasies,3 Sw.
J.L. & TRADE AM. 431 (1996).
8. The first case was Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports v. United States, No. 941627 (D.C. Cir. Ct. App. filed Sept. 14, 1994, withdrawn by voluntary motion to dismiss
Jan. 5, 1995) arising out of the Extraordinary Challenge Committee (ECC) proceeding, In
re Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, ECC-94-1904-01USA (Aug. 3, 1994).
This action was withdrawn on the basis of the settlement reached in "Lumber IV." The
second case was American Coalition for Competitive Trade (ACCT) v. United States, No.
97-1036 (D.C. Cir. Ct. App. Nov. 14, 1997) (complaint and petition for summary judgment). The case was dismissed unanimously by the U.S. Court of Appeals on the basis
that ACCT did not have legal standing to bring the case against President Clinton or the
U.S. government. See Timothy Burn, Judges Dismiss Challenge to NAFTA, WASH. TIMES,
Nov. 15, 1997, at C1, availablein 1997 WL 3689516.
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ing international trade agreements that it has in the United States.
However, in May of 1997, Canada lost an appeal before the WTO Appellate Body. The case, CertainMeasures ConcerningPeriodicals,9 held
that several measures Canada was using to protect its magazine industry from the onslaught of American competitors violated obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT").1 0 The decision was viewed by many Canadians as an affirmation of their fears
that the cost of free trade with the United States would be the eventual
loss of Canadian culture. For many Canadians, that is a price not worth
paying, and the response to the decision was harsh.1' While Canada has
had many bitter trade disputes with the United States (e.g. softwood
lumber,12 durum wheat, 13 pacific salmon,' 4) they have generally involved goods that do not directly affect the average Canadian. Because
the decision in the Periodicalscase threatened the commercial viability
of many Canadian magazines, it demonstrated to the Canadian public
the potential impact of international trade agreements on Canadian
identity. 5 As such, it is probably only a matter of time before the storm
brewing in America over NAFTA's constitutionality blows into Ottawa.
The second decision that may bring NAFTA's constitutionality into
question in Canada is less well known. In 1995, the Supreme Court of
Canada decided the case of MacMillan Bloedel v. Simpson, 16 which held
that the Canadian Parliament could not delegate core functions of the
superior courts to inferior courts or administrative tribunals. 7 As will
be discussed below, this decision raises serious doubts as to the constitutionality of the NAFTA dispute resolution process.
In anticipation of a constitutional challenge that is likely to come
before a Canadian court in the near future, this article examines
NAFTA's binational dispute resolution system and its compatibility
with Sections 96 to 100 of the Canadian Constitution. Part II describes
the NAFTA dispute resolution mechanism, while Part III briefly outlines constitutional concerns over NAFTA in Canada, the United States,

9. Canada - Certain Measures ConcerningPeriodicals,Report of the Appellate Body,
WT/DS31/AB/R, June 30, 1997, available in 1997 WL 432125, 1 (W.T.O.).
10. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 188.
11. See Marci McDonald, Menacing Magazines: Ottawa Faces Another Threat From
Washington, MACLEAN'S, March 24, 1997, at 54; John Schofield, Publish or Perish: Canada's Magazine Industry Facesan UncertainFuture, MACLEAN'S, June 2, 1997, at 44.
12. See In re Certain Softwood Lumber Products From Canada, Extraordinary Challenge Committee (ECC) proceeding, ECC-94-1904-01USA (Aug. 3, 1994).
13. See Marjorie Benson, The NAFTA Durum Dispute and the Canada Grain Act: A
Case Study in InstitutionalDevelopment, 5 CONST. F. 82 (1994).
14. See In the Matter of Canada's Landing Requirement for Pacific Coast Salmon and
Herring, United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Binational Panel Review, Panel
No. CDA-89-1807-01 (Oct. 16, 1989), 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), at 1026 (1991).
15. See Laura Eggertson et al., Copps Sets Stage for War Over Culture, GLOBE AND
MAIL, Feb. 11, 1997, at Al.
16. MacMillan Bloedel, Ltd. v. Simpson [1995] 4 S.C.R. 725 (Can.).
17. Id. at 757,1 43.
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and Mexico. Part IV outlines the constitutional structure of Canada and
its system of courts. Part IV also examines the constitutional limits on
the ability of the Canadian Parliament to take power away from the superior courts and give it to other adjudicative bodies. Part V discusses
the application of the constitutional limits on the delegation of decisionmaking power to the NAFTA binational tribunals. Part VI concludes
that unless Canada addresses the implications of international free
trade agreements as they relate to traditional notions of sovereignty
and adjudication, it will not be able to reap the full benefits of the
emerging global market.
II. THE NAFTA DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS: CHAPTER 19
A.

Canada'sNon-NAFTA Antidumping Procedures

Chapter 19 of NAFTA creates a procedure for settling disputes involving antidumping and countervailing duties between NAFTA countries. In order to understand the significance of this change to Canadian
law and procedure, it is important to examine the procedures used in
Canada for disputes with non-NAFTA parties and compare them with
the regime created by Chapter 19.
1.

Dumping and Antidumping

Goods may be considered "dumped" when the price that exporters
charge to their foreign consumers is less than the normal value of the
8
goods or the price charged to customers in their domestic market.'
Dumping exporters often subsidize these low export prices with high
prices in the home market where the producer may have a monopoly. In
this respect, dumping can be seen as the international equivalent of
predatory pricing. Antidumping laws seek to prevent exporters from
selling their products at unfairly low prices in other countries. In Canada, the offense of dumping contains two elements: (1) an export to
Canada priced at less than its fair value that (2) results in injury or
threat thereof to a Canadian industry. 19 The penalty that can be imposed in response to such practices is an "antidumping duty," a tariff
placed on the good designed to restore the export price to its fair
value. 20
2.

Subsidies and Countervailing Duties

Subsidies are financial contributions made by governments to local

18. See Special Import Measures Act, R.S.C., ch. S-15, § 2(1) (1985) (Can.).
19. Special Import Measures Act, R.S.C., ch. S-15, § 5 (1985) (Can.).

20. Id. § 3(1).
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producers. 21 Companies that receive subsidies can sell their goods in
foreign markets at prices lower than competing firms that do not receive government assistance. A countervailing duty seeks to prevent the
importation of subsidized goods into Canada at prices that are unfairly
low. A successful countervailing duty action requires: (1) a subsidy
given by the exporter's government; and (2) a resulting injury to a Canadian industry. 22 The penalty is a "countervailing duty," a tariff in23
tended to offset the government subsidy.
The following discussion on the procedures for antidumping duties
applies equally for countervailing duties. However, for the sake of brevity and to avoid repetition, only antidumping duties will be discussed.
3.

Procedures for Imposing Antidumping Duties in Canada

The legislation regarding antidumping is set out in the Canadian
Special Import Measures Act (SIMA)24 and the Canadian International
Trade Tribunal Act (CITTA).25 Under these Acts, in order to impose an
antidumping duty, there must be a finding of dumping and serious injury. 26 The institutional responsibilities for determining these issues
are separated, with "dumping" determinations being made by the Deputy Minister of National Revenue (DMNR),27 and "serious injury" determinations being made by the Canadian International Trade Tribunal
(CITT).28 Antidumping complaints can be initiated by the industry allegedly affected by the dumped good, which is usually a local competitor.

29

If there is evidence of dumping, the DMNR makes a provisional determination of the dumping margin and imposes provisional antidumping duties equal to the margin of dumping on the imports. 30 The
CITT then undertakes a thorough injury inquiry. 31 If the CITT makes a
finding of material injury, anti-dumping duties are imposed which reflect the DMNR's final margin of dumping determination. 32 If the CITT
does not find material injury, the investigation is terminated and any
33
provisional duties paid are refunded.

21. Id. § 2(1).

22. Id. § 6.
23. Id. § 3(1).
24.
25.
(Can).
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Special Import Measures Act, R.S.C., ch. S-15 (1985) (Can.).
Canadian International Trade Tribunal Act, R.S.C., ch.47 (4th Supp.) (1985)
Id. § 26(4). See also Special Import Measures Act § 5.
Special Import Measures Act §§ 38-41.
Canadian International Trade Tribunal Act § 20.
Id. §§ 22-30.
Special Import Measures Act § 38(1).
Canadian International Trade Tribunal Act §§ 22-30.
Special Import Measures Act § 41.

33. Id. § 43.
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While the CITT's decision is "final and conclusive," the CITT may
review its own findings if it is satisfied that such a review is warranted.3 4 For disputes between parties from Canada and a non-NAFTA
country, there are also appeals to the Federal Court of Appeal and then
35
to the Supreme Court of Canada on questions of law.
B.

Changes to the CanadianProceduresUnder NAFTA

Under NAFTA, the substantive domestic antidumping and countervailing duty laws and procedures of the NAFTA countries are preserved,36 but two new institutions have been created. The first entity is
the Binational Panel that reviews final antidumping and countervailing
duty determinations by domestic agencies. 37 The second entity is the
Extraordinary Challenge Committee that reviews Binational Panel decisions.3 8 The effect of these two tribunals is to replace judicial review
by national courts with Binational Panel review for antidumping and
countervailing duty determinations. 39 The SIMA and the CITTA have
been amended to reflect the changes required by NAFTA obligations.
1.

Policy reasons behind NAFTA Chapter 19

In the negotiations under the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, 40 and later under NAFTA, Canadian trade representatives were
eager to take the final decision-making authority over antidumping and
countervailing duties away from the courts of the United States. They
believed that Canadian firms were subject to unfair treatment at the
hands of American judges influenced by their national politics.41 The
Canadians sought to eliminate the American antidumping and countervailing duty laws as they applied to Canada and replace them with a
new set of laws to be interpreted and enforced by a binational tribunal. 42 When the Americans rejected any changes to U.S. law, the compromise reached was the creation of the Binational Panels and the Extraordinary Challenge Committees discussed in detail below.

34. Id. § 76.
35. Federal Court Act, R.S.C., ch. F-7, § 28 (1985) (Can.).
36. See NAFTA, supra note 4, at art. 1902.1. Each Party reserves the right to apply
its antidumping law and countervailing duty law to goods imported from the territory of
the other party.
37. Id. art. 1904(1).
38. Id. art. 1904(13). See also id. annex 1904.13.
39. Id. art. 1904(1).
40. Canada-United States Free-Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1987-Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.Can., 27 I.L.M. 281 (entered into force on Jan. 1, 1989).
41. See Demetrios G. Metropoulos, ConstitutionalDimensions of the North American
Free Trade Agreement, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 141, 145 (1994).
42. See Gregory W. Carman, Resolution of Trade Disputes By Chapter 19 Panels: A
Long-Term Solution or Interim Procedureof Dubious Constitutionality,21 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 1, 2 (1997).
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2.

Binational Panels

Once the CITT issues a final determination, an "involved party"
from a NAFTA country has 30 days to request a review by a NAFTA
Panel. 43 The term "involved party" is defined as the importing party or
the party whose goods are the subject of the final determination. 44 Upon
a request for Binational Panel review, that process begins and the traditional path of judicial review is unavailable. The Panel first obtains
the administrative record from CITT. A representative of that agency
can appear before the Panel. 45 Interested parties with standing to appear in a traditional appeal can submit briefs and present oral arguments. 46 Based on this evidence, the Panel assesses the agency's deter47
mination to see if it complied with the substantive law of the country.
The Panel then decides whether to uphold the agency's decision or remand the proceeding for action not inconsistent with the Panel's decision. 48 A written opinion with reasons for the decision is provided along
with dissenting opinions. The standard of review, and the legal principles to be applied by the Panel are those that a court of the defendant
party would use. 49 The decision is binding with respect to the parties
and the particular matter before the Panel. 50 In the event of an adverse
finding, a defendant state is required to change its laws to conform to
the Panel's determination of the requirements of NAFTA. 5 1 Article
1904(11) states that:
A final determination shall not be reviewed under any judicial review procedures of the importing Party if an involved
Party requests a panel with respect to that determination
within the time limits set out in this Article. No Party may
provide in its domestic legislation 52for an appeal from a
panel decision to its domestic courts.
The purpose of this section is to avoid Panel decisions that contradict rulings by federal courts with respect to the same final determinations. By way of example, suppose an American producer is exporting to
Canada and is accused of dumping. If the CITT rules against her, an
antidumping duty is levied against her products. She may then request
a Binational Panel review. In this case, all Canadian importers bound
to pay the antidumping duty would have to appear before the Binational Panel and would thereby be unable to go before the Canadian
43.

NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1904(4).

44. Id. art. 1911
45. Id. art. 1904(7).
46. Id. art. 1904(14).
47. Id. art. 1904(8).

48. Id.
49. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1904(3).
50. Id. art. 1904(11).
51. Id. art. 1904(15).
52. Id. art. 1904(11).
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courts to challenge the ruling.
Now suppose that the Binational Panel decides in favor of the
American exporter and her Canadian competitors believe that the Panel
exceeded its jurisdiction or applied the wrong standard of judicial review. In such an instance, there would be no recourse to the Canadian
courts. As is often the case with international adjudication, the Panel's
decisions are made by ad hoc judges who are appointed from a roster for
a particular case. 53 There are no permanent clerks or research assistants. 54 So unlike an appellate court, the Binational Panels have no institutional longevity, increasing the likelihood of poor reasoning or inconsistent decisions.
Each of the three NAFTA countries is to select at least 25 candidates for membership on Binational Panels. 55 The Agreement expresses
a preference for sitting or retired judges as panelists. 56 Each Panel is to
consist of five members; two selected by each country involved in the
dispute and the final panelists selected by agreement between the two
countries.57 If no agreement can be reached as to the final panelist, the
countries are to decide by lot which of them will select the fifth panelist,
excluding candidates eliminated by peremptory challenges. 58
Additionally, the Binational Panels serve one function other than
judicial review. Under Article 1903, a NAFTA country may request that
an amendment to another Party's antidumping or countervailing duty
laws be referred to a Panel for a declaratory opinion on whether the
amendment is consistent with the GATT and NAFTA.5 9
3.

The Extraordinary Challenge Committee ("ECC")

NAFTA allows a limited right of appeal to the ECC that reviews
certain Panel decisions. 60 However, appeals are only permitted when:
(1) there has been gross misconduct, bias, serious conflict of interest, or
other material misconduct on the part of a panelist; (2) there has been a
serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure; or (3) a Panel
manifestly exceeds its powers, authority or jurisdiction, for example, by
failing to apply the appropriate standard of judicial review. 61 It must
also be established that the action materially affected the Panel's decision, and that the decision threatens the integrity of the Binational

53. NAFTA supranote 4, annex 1901.2.

54. Id.

55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1903.
60. Id. art. 1904(13).

61. Id. art. 19 04(13)(a).
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Panel review process. 62
Each NAFTA country selects five sitting or retired judges as potential ECC members. 63 From this roster, the two opposing countries in a
dispute pick a committee of three.6 4 After each country selects one
member, the two countries draw lots to determine which side gets to
choose the third member. 65 The ECC either affirms the Panel decision
or vacates it for remand to a new Panel. 66 The ECC's rulings are binding with respect to the matter and the parties involved. 67 As is the case
for the Binational Panels, Chapter 19 of NAFTA expressly prohibits any
Party to the Agreement from establishing legislatively a procedure to
68
challenge ECC determinations in their respective court systems.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM POSED BY CHAPTER 19
A.

United States

Several articles have been written as to whether Chapter 19 of
NAFTA violates Article III of the U.S. Constitution, with no consensus
having been reached as to the correct answer. 69 The principal issue is
whether NAFTA Binational Panels are without authority to review decisions of the United States' Department of Commerce and the United
States' International Trade Commission by virtue of Article III Section
1 of the United States Constitution. That Section reads: "The judicial
power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
70
and establish."
By entering NAFTA, Congress and the President may have exceeded the authority granted to them respectively by Articles I and II of
the Constitution, having unlawfully ceded powers encompassed within
the sovereignty of the United States to an international tribunal.

62. Id. art. 1904(13)(b).
63. NAFTA, supra note 4, annex 1904.13.

64. Id.
65. Id.

66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. art. 1904(11).
69. For example, Demetrios Metropoulos concludes that Chapter 19 of NAFTA does
violate Article III of the United States' Constitution. See Demetrios G. Metropoulos, ConstitutionalDimensions of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 27 CORNELL INT'L.
L.J. 141 (1994). Denis J. Edwards reaches the opposite conclusion. Denis J. Edwards,
NAFTA andArticle III:
Making a Drama Out of a Crisis,NAFTA: LAw & Bus. REV. AMS.,
vol. I, No. 2, 69 (1995). For other articles on this topic, see supra note 7.
70. U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 1.
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B. Mexico
Article 13 of the Mexican Constitution states that, "[n]o one shall
be judged based on special laws or statutes."71 The second paragraph of
Article 17 provides that, "[aill persons have a right to the administration of justice by expedite courts that shall administrate justice in the
time and terms established by law and the decisions of such courts shall
be issued in a prompt, complete and impartial manner." 72 It has been
suggested that by removing judicial review from the Mexican courts,
Article 1904(11) of NAFTA is inconsistent with the above-mentioned
73
sections of the Mexican Constitution.
C.

Canada

The same type of contention could be raised in Canada. A strong
argument can be made that Chapter 19 of NAFTA takes away the
power of judicial review of administrative tribunals from the Canadian
superior courts in violation of Section 96 of the Canadian Constitution.
What follows is a detailed description and evaluation of this argument.
IV. LIMITS ON THE DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL POWERS

Before addressing the constitutionality of NAFTA Chapter 19 Binational Panels, it will be helpful to review Canada's constitutional and
judicial structures. This will assist in illustrating the limitations the
Canadian constitution places on Parliament's ability to relocate decision-making powers from the superior courts to administrative tribunals.
A.

ConstitutionalStructure of Canada

The Constitution of Canada is composed of written documents and
constitutional customs. 74 The written documents consist of what was
formerly known as the British North America Act of 1867 (the BNA Act)
75 and the more recently adopted Canadian Charter of Rights and Free76
doms (the Charter).
The BNA Act is the imperial statute that triggered the confederation of the British Colonies that became Canada. It divides legislative
power in the Canadian federal system between the Federal Parliament
71.

CONSTITUTION POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOs, art. 13 (Mex.).

72. Id. art.17.
73. See Luis Manuel Perez de Acha, BinationalPanels: A Conflict of Idiosyncrasies, 3
Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 431, 434 (1996).
74. See PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA, ch. 1 (3d ed. 1992).

75. British North America Act, 30 & 31 Vict., ch. 3 (U.K.) (now referred to as the Constitution Act, 1867).
76. Schedule B Canada Act, 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.).
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and the Provincial Legislatures. 77 Section 92 of the BNA Act sets out
the enumerated classes of subjects over which the provinces have exclusive legislative competence and Section 91 outlines the areas in which
the federal Parliament has exclusive jurisdiction. 78 In 1982 two developments occurred. First, the BNA Act was renamed the Constitution
Act 1867. Second, the Charter came into effect and entrenched a number of rights and freedoms and gave Canadian courts the responsibility
79
to enforce them.
B.

Courts

One of the principal foundations upon which the Canadian Constitution rests is its unified national judiciary, the result of a compromise
between federal and provincial powers made by the Fathers of Confederation in 1867. While the provinces were given responsibility for the
administration of justice under Section 92(14) of the constitution, 80 under Section 96, the Governor General was given the power to appoint
judges to the superior, district and county courts in each province. 81
Section 100 obliges the Parliament of Canada to fix and pay the salaries
of these judges. 82 The possible overlap of federal and provincial constitutional power with respect to the courts has led to cooperation between
the levels of government in maintaining a strong unified judicial presence throughout Canada.
1.

Nature of the Superior Courts

The Canadian Constitution applies a British parliamentary model
for government to a federated state. At the time of Confederation in
1867, each of the uniting provinces' own courts were modeled on the
English system. 83 The superior courts had jurisdiction throughout the
province. 84 Upon the creation of Canada, it was decided that the courts
already existing in the provinces would continue to operate.8 5 This gave
rise to the general jurisdiction trial courts that are now the superior
courts in the provinces.8 6 As direct descendants of the English superior
courts, the Canadian provincial superior courts (often referred to as the
Section 96 courts), possess "inherent jurisdiction," which means they
77. Constitution Act, 1867, R.S.C., App. No. 5, §§ 91-92 (1985) (Can.). See also
1 (4th ed. 1973).
78. Constitution Act, 1867 §§ 91-92.
79. Constitution Act, 1982, R.S.C., App. No. 44, § 53(2) (1985) (Can.).
80. Constitution Act, 1867 § 92(14).
81. Id. § 96.
82. Id. § 100.
83. T.A. Cromwell, Aspects of Constitutional Judicial Review in Canada, 46 S.C.L.
REV. 1027, 1029 (1995).
84. PETER W. HOGG, supra note 74, at 162.
85. Id.
86. Id.
ALBERT ABEL, LASKIN'S CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ch.
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have original jurisdiction in any matter unless it is clearly taken away
87
by statute.
As discussed in the next section, the Supreme Court of Canada has
recently held in MacMillan that the Section 96 courts possess a constitutionally guaranteed core of jurisdiction that cannot be removed by either provincial or federal legislation.88 The Court also held that neither
the federal nor the provincial government could confer on an inferior
court or tribunal the powers of a superior court.8 9 It is these two limitations on the delegation of adjudicative power that question the constitutional validity of Chapter 19 of NAFTA in Canada.
Because the Section 96 courts have general jurisdiction, there is no
need for separate federal courts to decide "federal" issues.9 0 This gives
rise to a largely unitary court system operating within the federal state.
In Canada, the jurisdiction of a court does not depend on whether the
law to be applied emanates from the federal or the provincial governments. As a result, while contract law is within the provincial sphere of
jurisdiction, contract cases are presided over by federally appointed
judges in the provincial superior courts. The courts are creatures of
provincial legislation, with facilities and staff provided and paid for by
the provinces. 91 Appeals from the superior courts go to provincial courts
of appeal and can then be appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. 92
Section 101 of the Constitution of Canada permits Parliament to
create "a General Court of Appeal for Canada" and "any additional
Courts for the better Administration of the Laws of Canada." 93 The Supreme Court of Canada and the Federal Court were created by the federal Government pursuant to Section 101. The Canadian Supreme
Court is a general court of appeal for Canada, having jurisdiction over
all laws within the legislative competence of both the federal or the provincial legislatures.9 4 Appeals lie from all courts to the Supreme Court
of Canada, which thereby exercises a unifying influence. 95
The Federal Court has a trial and an appellate division. 96 Its jurisdiction is limited to administrative judicial review of federal tribunals,
certain areas of federal law such as copyright and admiralty, and actions involving the federal Crown. 97 The Federal Court does not have
"ancillary" jurisdiction, and its jurisdiction is largely concurrent with
87. T.A. Cromwell, Aspects of ConstitutionalJudicial Review in Canada,supra note
83, at 1031.
88. MacMillan Bloedel, Ltd. v. Simpson [19951 4 S.C.R.725, 740,1 15 (Can.).

89. Id.
90. T.A. Cromwell, supra note 83, at 1030.

91. Id.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

PETER W. HOGG, supra note 74, at 162-166.
Constitution Act, 1867, R.S.C., App. No. 5, § 101 (1985) (Can.).
T.A. Cromwell, supranote 83, at 1029.
Id.
Federal Court Act, R.S.C., ch. F-7, § 4 (1985) (Can.).
Id. §§ 16, 18, 20, 22, 28.
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the provincial superior courts. 98
2.

Delegation of Judicial Powers

As Canadian society has grown more complex, the number of disputes involving Canadians has increased dramatically. To cope with the
greater demand for the judicial settlement of disputes, Parliament and
the legislatures have created many specialised tribunals to supplement
the work of the Section 96 courts. 99 Each new social structure created
has given rise to new conflicts, which the government has addressed
through regulation. This in turn has often resulted in the creation of
new administrative tribunals. 100 Several factors can explain the preference of Parliament and the legislatures for administrative tribunals
with decision-making powers: the desire for a specialist body; the need
for a comprehensive investigative, adjudicative and policy-formation
approach to certain problems; and lack of another way to address the
sheer volume of disputes which arise in certain sectors.
Little attention was paid to Sections 96 through 101,101 the "judica-

98. Quebec N. Shore Paper Co. v. Canadian Pac., Ltd., (1977) 2 S.C.R. 1054, 1065-66
(Can.).
99. MacMillan Bloedel, Ltd. v. Simpson [1995] 4 S.C.R at 761, 1 53.
100. Id.
101. Sections 96 to 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867 provide:
96. The Governor General shall appoint the Judges of the Superior, District,
and County Courts in each Province, except those of the Courts of Probate in
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick.
97. Until the Laws relative to Property and Civil Rights in Ontario, Nova
Scotia, and New Brunswick, and the Procedure of the Courts in those Provinces, are made uniform, the Judges of the Courts of those Provinces appointed by the Governor General shall be selected from the respective Bars
of those Provinces.
98. The Judges of the Courts of Quebec shall be selected from the Bar of that
Province.
99. (1) Subject to subsection two of this section, the Judges of the Superior
Courts shall hold office during good behaviour, but shall be removable by the
Governor General on Address of the Senate and House of Commons.
(2) A Judge of a Superior Court, whether appointed before or after the
coming into force of this section, shall cease to hold office upon attaining the
age of seventy-five years, or upon the coming into force of this section if at
that time he has already attained that age.
100. The Salaries, Allowances, and Pensions of the Judges of the Superior,
District, and County Courts (except the Courts of Probate in Nova Scotia and
New Brunswick), and of the Admiralty Courts in Cases where the Judges
thereof are for the Time being paid by Salary, shall be fixed and provided by
the Parliament of Canada.
101. The Parliament of Canada may, notwithstanding anything in this Act,
from Time to Time provide for the Constitution, Maintenance, and Organization of a General Court of Appeal for Canada, and for the Establishment of
any additional Courts for the better Administration of the Laws of Canada.
Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., ch. 3 (U.K.).
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ture sections" of the Constitution at the time of Confederation.10 2 However, since the 1930s, the Privy Council and the Supreme Court of Canada have attached considerable significance to these Sections, extending the scope of their application beyond the mere appointment of
103
judges.
The conferral of judicial functions on bodies that are not superior
courts is not expressly prohibited by the judicature sections of the Constitution. However, the Supreme Court of Canada has interpreted Sections 96 to 100 as a limit on the power of the provincial legislatures to
delegate decision-making power. 104 The Court has held that the provincial legislatures may not confer on a body other than a superior court,
judicial functions analogous to those performed by a superior court. 105 A
tribunal that is given such functions is illegally constituted unless it
meets the requirements of Sections 96 to 100 (i.e. members must be appointed by the federal Government, drawn from the bar of the appropriate provinces and receive salaries that are fixed and provided for by
the federal Government). 106 Recently it has been made clear that the
same restrictions apply to the federal Parliament at least to the extent
that it cannot take certain "core" functions away from the superior
10 7
courts and give them to inferior courts or administrative tribunals.
It should be noted that as the courts of inherent jurisdiction, Canadian superior courts seem to have no limits to their jurisdiction. Therefore, they can be given novel jurisdiction or they can adjudicate disputes
that were traditionally heard by inferior courts. 0 8
3.

History of the Section 96 Cases up until MacMillan

Initially, Canadian courts refused to accept that Parliament or the
legislatures could transfer any adjudicative powers of the superior
courts to inferior courts or tribunals. 0 9 However, as modern society led
to a proliferation of economic relationships that required regulation by
specialised administrative agencies, the courts gradually relaxed their
grip on adjudication.1o In order to preserve the constitutional role of
the Section 96 courts, Canadian judges developed a test that sought to

102. See REESOR,

supra note 50, at 251.

103. See discussion of cases infra pp. 114-16.
104. See PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 7.3(a) (3rd ed. 1992).
105. See Reference re Residential Tenancies Act (N.S. 1992), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 186.
(Can.); Sobeys Stores Ltd. v. Yeomans [1989] 1 S.C.R. 238 (Can.); Attorney Gen. of Que. v.
Grondin [1983] 2 S.C.R. 364 (Can.); Re Residential Tenancies Act [1981] 1 S.C.R. 714
(Can.).
106. Constitution Act, 1867, R.S.C., App. No. 5, §§ 96-100 (1985) (Can.).
107. See the majority decision in MacMillan Bloedel v. Simpson [19951 4 S.C.R. 725,
discussed infra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
108. See HOGG, supra note 56, at 7.3(d).
109. MacMillan Bloedel v. Simpson [1995] 4 S.C.R. 1 55.
110. MacMillan Bloedel v. Simpson [1995] 4 S.C.R. 1 57.
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balance the need to maintain a strong constitutional position of Section
96 courts with the need to provide sufficient scope for the creation of effective administrative tribunals.'
The "no-delegation" position was entrenched law in Canada as late
as 1938, when the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held that
the Ontario legislature could not confer any judicial powers on the Ontario Municipal Board by virtue of Section 96 of the Constitution. 112 But
113
that doctrine proved to be unworkable. In Reference re Adoption Act,
the Supreme Court rejected the "no-delegation" approach and held that
increases in the jurisdiction of inferior tribunals were permitted so long
as their new power broadly conformed to the jurisdiction exercised by
inferior courts. 1 4 In light of the need for more adjudicators, the legislatures and the courts continued to expand the provinces' power of judicial delegation. In 1949, the Privy Council held that as long as a judicial
power had not been one that was traditionally exercised by the Section
1 5
96 courts, the legislatures could delegate it to an inferior tribunal.
The next major development in this doctrine occurred in 1977 when
the Supreme Court of Canada decided Tomko v. Labour Relations
Board (Nova Scotia).116 In Tomko, the Nova Scotia Labour Relations
Board issued a 'cease and desist' order. 117 That order was challenged
under Section 96 because it was analogous to a mandatory injunction,
which was within the traditional jurisdiction of the superior courts. 118
The Supreme Court ruled that, in determining whether a delegation of
judicial power violated Section 96, the transferred power must be considered in the context of the tribunal's object and purpose." 19
The test from Tomko was refined by the Supreme Court of Canada
in 1980 in the decision of Re Residential Tenancies Act, 1979.120 The
Justices in Residential Tenancies held that courts must examine the institutional setting of a tribunal in order to determine whether a particular power or jurisdiction can validly be conferred on a provincial
body. The Court wrote:
An administrative tribunal may be clothed with power
formerly exercised by Section 96 courts, so long as that
power is merely an adjunct of, or ancillary to, a broader
administrative or regulatory structure. If, however, the
impugned power forms a dominant aspect of the func111. See Madam Justice McLachlin in MacMillan, supra note 58.
112. See Toronto v. York [1938] 1 D.L.R. 593 (Can.).
113. Reference re Adoption Act, 1938 S.C.R. 398 (Can.).
114. Id. at 421.
115. See Labour Relations Bd. of Sask. v. John East Iron Works, Ltd. [1949] 3 D.L.R.
488 (Can.).
116. See Tomko v. Labour Relations Bd. (N.S.) [1977] 1 S.C.R. 112 (Can.).

117. Id.
118. Id. at 113.

119. Id. at 120.
120. Re Residential Tenancies Act, 1979 [1981] 1 S.C.R. 714 (Can.).
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tion of the tribunal, such that the tribunal itself must be
then the conferral
considered to be acting 'like
121 a court',
of the power is ultra vires.
Under this approach, an administrative scheme is only invalid
when adjudication is the sole or central function of the tribunal, such
122
that the tribunal can be said to be operating like a Section 96 court.
Justice Dickson laid down a three-step approach to determining
whether a transfer of power from a Section 96 court to an inferior court
was constitutional.123 The first step is to determine if the power given to
the inferior tribunal historically fell within the jurisdiction of the Section 96 courts. 24 The second step is to determine whether the power is
judicial.1 25 If the power is judicial and was exercised exclusively 126 by
the superior courts at the time of confederation, the inquiry moves to
the third step, the consideration of the institutional setting in which the
judicial power is employed. 127 If the exercise of power is subsidiary or
ancillary to what is predominantly an administrative function, or is incidental to the achievement of a broader policy goal of the legislature,
the transfer of Section 96 judicial power is nonetheless valid. 128 If, however, the superior court power conferred on the tribunal is a dominant
part of its function, the tribunal will be seen as acting like a Section 96
court and will be found to be unconstitutional. 129
While the above Section 96 case law clearly binds provincial legislatures, the applicability of this analysis to the federal Parliament was an
undecided issue in Canada for some time. 130 In 1992, in the case of
Chrysler Canada v. Canada (Competition Tribunal),'3 the majority of
the Supreme Court of Canada decided not to rule on whether Section 96
limited the powers of Parliament.1 32 However, this issue now seems to
have been resolved with MacMillan and the decisions that have

121. Id. at 733-34.
122. Id. at 736.
123. Id. at 734-35.
124. In Sobeys Stores Ltd. v. Yeomans [1989] 1 S.C.R. 238 (Can.), Madam Justice Wilson suggested that the issue was not the remedies exercised by the superior courts at the
time of Confederation, but whether the dispute was one which fell within their jurisdiction.
125. Re Residential Tenancies Act, 1979 [1981] 1 S.C.R. 714, 734 (Can..).
126. The requirement that the imputed power had to have been exercised exclusively
by the superior courts at the time of confederation in order to be unconstitutional was laid
down by the Supreme Court in Attorney General of Que. v. Grondin, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 364
(Can.).

127. Addy v. Queen [19851, 22 D.L.R. (4th) 52 (Can.).
128. Re Residential Tenancies Act, 1979 [1981] 1 S.C.R. at 735-36.
129. Id.
130. See PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 7.2 (3d ed. 1992).

131. Chrysler of Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Competition Tribunal) [1992] 2 S.C.R. 394
(Can.).
132. Id. at 443-44.

1998

CANADIAN CONSTITUTION

adopted it.'3
C. MacMillan Bloedel v. Simpson
In MacMillan, the defendant Simpson was a minor who was 17
years of age at the time of his arrest. 34 Simpson violated an injunction
issued by the British Columbia Supreme Court prohibiting certain protests. 135 As a result, Simpson was charged with contempt of court. 136 At
trial, Simpson made an application to be tried in youth court pursuant
to Section 47(2) of the Young Offenders Act, an Act of the Parliament of
Canada, which transfers jurisdiction over contempt of court committed
by a minor to the youth court. 137 That section reads:
47... (2) The youth court has exclusive jurisdiction in
respect of every contempt of court committed by a young
person against the youth court whether or not committed in the face of the court and every contempt of court
committed by a young person against any
other court
38
otherwise than in the face of that court.
39
The application was dismissed and Simpson was convicted.
Simpson appealed on the ground that the British Columbia Supreme
Court had no jurisdiction to try him. 140 The Court of Appeal upheld the
conviction holding that 47(2) of the Young Offenders Act was unconstitutional. 141 It reasoned that because the contempt power is within the
core jurisdiction of the superior courts, it is beyond the competence of
Parliament to remove any part of the contempt powers from those
courts. 142 In a five-four decision, the Supreme Court upheld the ruling
of the Court of Appeal.

On the basis of the Residential Tenancies test, the Supreme Court
held that the grant of jurisdiction to youth courts was permissible.
First, on the historical test, the contempt of court charge was clearly
within Section 96 jurisdiction at the time of Confederation. 4 3 Second,
jurisdiction of the youth court was unquestionably to be exercised judi-

133. In Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court (P.E.I.), [1994] 3
S.C.R. 3 at 68 the majority of the Supreme Court affirmed that section 96 did apply to tribunals created by Parliament as did the majority of the Supreme Court in Reference re
Residential Tenancies Act (N.S. 1992), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 186 1 73.
134. MacMillan Bloedel, Ltd. v. Simpson [1995] 4 S.C.R. at 734, 1 4.

135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.

5.

138. Young Offenders Act, R.S.C., ch. Y-1, § 47(2) (1985) (Can.).
139. MacMillan Bloedel at 734, J 5.
140. Id. at 736, 1 8.

141. Id.
142. Id.
143. MacMillan Bloedel at 747, 1 26.
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cially.'" However on the third test, the institutional setting test, the
grant of jurisdiction was found to be constitutional.145 The Court concluded that the institutional setting of the transfer of power was the
youth courts, which were part of a novel approach to curbing criminal
conduct. 146 These courts have an expertise in providing procedural protections appropriate for youths and in deciding punishments for convicted young offenders. The Court held that the power to punish youths'
contempt of superior courts was merely ancillary to those primary functions. 147 Accordingly, granting jurisdiction to punish youths for contempt of superior courts did not infringe upon Section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867.148 On that issue, the entire Court agreed. The real
issue in the case was whether the delegation of contempt power over
youths to an inferior court could be exclusive, such that superior court
jurisdiction was completely removed. 149 On this issue the court split five
judges to four.
Chief Justice Lamer wrote the majority decision that made two
dramatic changes to the law regarding Section 96. First, the majority
decision made clear for the first time that Section 96 limits the powers
of both Parliament and the provincial legislatures, since the case involved a delegation of judicial power by Parliament. The dissent did not
take any objection with this innovation and subsequent cases have affirmed this principle.1 50 Second, the majority held that under Section
96, jurisdiction to decide certain matters could never be taken away
from the superior courts, and that contempt of court was part of that
"core" jurisdiction. 151 Chief Justice Lamer wrote:
The superior courts have a core or inherent jurisdiction
which is integral to their operations. The jurisdiction
which forms this core cannot be removed from the superior courts by either level of government, without
amending the Constitution. Without this core jurisdiction, s. 96 could not be said either to ensure uniformity
in the judicial system throughout the country or to protect the independence of the judiciary. Furthermore,
the power of superior courts to fully control their own
process is, in our system where the superior court of
general jurisdiction is central,
essential to the mainte15 2
nance of the rule of law itself.
Lamer did not attempt to provide a finite list of the "core functions"
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

150. See Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court (P.E.I.) 68; Reference re Residential Tenancies Act (N.S. 1992), 1 73.
151. MacMillan at 740, 1 15.

152. Id.
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of the Section 96 courts. Instead, he quoted Keith Mason with approval
to the effect that the "ubiquitous nature" of inherent jurisdiction "precludes any exhaustive enumeration of the powers which are thus exercised by the courts." 153 Chief Justice Lamer was of the opinion that inherent jurisdiction is that which is integral to the operations of the
superior courts. 15 4 For such jurisdiction, no part of it could be removed
by either level of government in the absence of a constitutional amendment. 155 The majority was of the opinion that adjudicating contempt of
court proceedings was part of the "core functions" of the Section 96
courts. 156 Therefore, Section 47(2) was valid to the extent that it conferred jurisdiction on the youth court but was inoperative in depriving
the superior court of its jurisdiction to convict the appellant of contempt.157
Lamer quoted from I. H. Jacob's "The Inherent Jurisdiction of the
Court" and concluded:
While inherent jurisdiction may be difficult to define, it
is of paramount importance to the existence of a superior court. The full range of powers which comprise the
inherent jurisdiction of a superior court are, together, its
"essential character" or "immanent attribute". To remove any part of this core emasculates the 158
court, making it something other than a superior court.
Madam Justice McLachlin wrote for the four dissenting judges. The
dissenting opinion viewed the Residential Tenancies test as sufficient
for preserving the functions of administrative tribunals without violating the constitution. Justice McLachlin rejected as unnecessary the additional condition that the transfer of judicial power to inferior tribu159
nals not involve any aspect of the "core" powers of the superior courts.
The dissenters wrote that the proposed "core test" needlessly derogated
60
from the functional approach of the Residential Tenancies test.

153. Keith Mason, The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court, 57 AUSTL. L.J. 449, 449
(1983), as quoted by Justice Lamer in MacMillan, supra note 75, 1 33.
154. MacMillan, 4 S.C.R. at 754, 1 38.
155. Id. at 757, 42.
156. Id. at 754, 1 38.
157. Id. at 757, 1 43.
158. Id. 1 30, Justice Lamer quoting Isaac H. Jacob, The Inherent Jurisdictionof the
Court, 23 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 23, 27 (1970).
159. MacMillan 4 S.C.R. at 780, 1 93
160. Id. at 779, 91.
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APPLICATION OF SECTION 96 JURISPRUDENCE TO THE NAFTA
PANELS

Constitutionalityof Chapter 19 Panels
1.

Does Section 96 Jurisprudence Apply to the Federal and
Supreme Courts?

A threshold question concerns the applicability of cases like MacMillan to the federal courts. An argument can be made that the cases
discussed above address the unconstitutional creation of provincial superior courts or the removal of power from provincial superior courts.
Since NAFTA Binational Panels remove the power of judicial review
from the Federal Court and the Supreme Court of Canada, and not the
provincial superior courts, there is no constitutional difficulty, at least
not as defined above. This argument is not completely without merit.
There has been some debate in Canada as to whether the Federal Court
and the Supreme Court of Canada, as creations of federal statute, are
"superior courts" such that the limitations of Sections 96-100 of the
Constitution apply to them.
The issue was first raised in an article by W.R. Lederman,1 6 1 where
he argues that the term "superior court" in Section 96 of the Constitution applies to the federal superior courts created under Section 101.162
According to Lederman, the Federal and Supreme Court are subject to
the same constitutional limitations regarding delegation of decisionmaking authority as are the provincial superior courts:
[I]ndeed the General Court of Appeal for Canada would
necessarily and pre-eminently be a superior court on the
English model. To consider that Section 101 could mean
anything else would be so incongruous as to be absurd.
Surely the B.N.A. Act necessarily implies that the "General Court of Appeal for Canada" must be a superior
court in the fullest sense, and it is guaranteed typical
and appropriate superior court appellate jurisdiction.
When one realizes that the guaranteed jurisdiction of
the provincial superior courts rests upon a wider basis
of necessary implication than the "mere" federal appointing power in section 96, as explained earlier, then
it follows that the same wider basis of implication is
equally relevant to the federal superior courts and
should confer on them a similarly guaranteed jurisdic161. William. R. Lederman, The Independence of the Judiciary,34 CAN. B. REV. 1139,
1176 (1956).
162. Id. at 1175-77.
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tion. 163
This view was rejected by Justice Laskin as follows: "It has been
suggested by Lederman that the limitations of ss. 96 to 100 of the
B.N.A. Act may properly be imported into Section 101 so as to restrict
federal courts in the same way, but there is no tenable ground of history
164
or text to support the suggestion."
Under the Lederman approach, Parliament can take "core" jurisdiction away from the provincial superior courts and give it to the federal
superior courts, but it cannot take it away from all superior courts and
65
give it to an inferior tribunal.1
This issue seems to have been resolved in favor of the Lederman
approach in the case of Addy v.The Queen. 166 In Addy, the plaintiff was
a judge of the Federal Court who was 69 years of age. 167 The Federal
Court Act provided that judges of the Federal Court must cease to hold
office upon attaining the age of seventy years. 168 Section 99(2) of the
Constitution provided that judges of the superior courts could hold office until they reached the age of 75.169 Addy argued that the mandatory
retirement provision of the Federal Court Act was inconsistent with
Section 99(2) of the Constitution and therefore was of no force and effect. 170 The Federal Court agreed, holding that the Supreme Court of
Canada and the Federal Court of Canada were superior courts within
the meaning of Section 99(2). The Court quoted from Blackstone's
Commentaries:
A superior court as distinguished from an inferior court possess broad supervisory jurisdiction over inferior tribunals
and keeps them within the bounds of their authority by removing their proceedings to be determined in such superior
court
or by prohibiting their progress in the inferior tribu17 1
nal.
If the federal courts are "superior" for the purposes of Section 99,
they must also be "superior" for the purposes of Section 96, as Sections

163. Id.
164. See BORA LASKIN, CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 76 (4th ed. rev. 1975).
165. Justice Lamer in MacMillan seems to reject the notion that inherent powers
could always be transferred between superior courts. At paragraph 42 of that decision he
wrote: The full panoply of contempt powers is so vital to the superior court that even removing the jurisdiction in question here and transferring it to another court with judges
appointed pursuant to s. 96 would offend our Constitution." See MacMillan Bloedel, 1 42.
166. Addy v. Queen [19851, 22 D.L.R. (4th) 52 (Can.). The federal Government did not
appeal the decision, and section 8 of the Federal Court Act was amended to raise the age
of retirement for federal court judges to 75 years. S.C. 1987, ch.21, §7.
167. Addy v. Queen [1985] 22 D.L.R. at 53.
168. The Federal Court Act R.S.C. ch. 10 (2d Supp.) § 8(2) (1970) (Can.).
169. Constitution Act, 1867, R.S.C., App. No. 5, § 99(2) (1985) (Can.).
170. Addy v. Queen [1985], 22 D.L.R. at 55.
171. 3 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 43-46 (1768), cited in Addy, 22 D.L.R. at 58.
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96 to 100 have consistently been read together to form the "judicature
sections" of the Canadian Constitution. As a result, the constitutional
restrictions of Section 96 apply equally to the federal and provincial superior courts.
Having established that Section 96 applies to Chapter 19 of
NAFTA, two similar but distinct questions must be addressed. The first
is whether it is a violation of Section 96 of the Canadian Constitution to
give the Binational Panels the power of judicial review in antidumping
cases. The second is whether taking the power of judicial review away
from the Federal Court violates Section 96. Each of these will be addressed in turn.
2.

Is the Grant of Jurisdiction to the Binational Panel
Unconstitutional?

According to recent Canadian case law on Section 96, before applying the Residential Tenancies test, the essential nature of the inferior tribunal and the power being delegated must be determined. Only
after the court has properly categorized the pith and substance of the
legislation, can it proceed with the three-part test laid down in Residential Tenancies.
a.

Characterization of the Law

The implementing legislation for Chapter 19 of NAFTA creates a
Binational Panel that reviews antidumping decisions of federal tribunals. This can only be characterized as judicial review. The scheme created may be considered judicial review in the broad sense or, alternatively, could be characterized more specifically as judicial review of
antidumping and countervailing decisions. In either case, the primary
nature of the issue in question revolves around the question of the limits on Parliament's ability to delegate judicial review power.
b.

Historical Inquiry Test

The Historical Inquiry Test is the first part of the inquiry laid down
in Residential Tenancies. It asks whether the subject matter at issue is
one which is "broadly conformable" to the exclusive jurisdiction exercised by section 96 at the time of Confederation. 172 There can be no
doubt that this is true of judicial review. But that does not end the historical inquiry. In Reference re Young Offenders Act, Chief Justice
Lamer added a qualification to the "historical inquiry" test. 173 Justice
Lamer suggested that the legislative purpose of the grant of power, and

172. Re Residential Tenancies Act, 1979 [1981] 1 S.C.R. 714, 734 (Can.).
173. Reference re Young Offenders Act (P.E.I.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 252, 269 (Can.).
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the nature of the scheme in question, should be considered. 74 If what
appeared to be a power that was traditionally exercised by the superior
courts, forms part of a new legal regime, it will not violate Section 96.
Applying this approach to Reference re Young Offenders Act, Justice
Lamer concluded that the powers granted to youth courts, and the administrative scheme set up under the Young Offenders Act, could be
viewed as having created "new powers or jurisdiction." Such jurisdiction
was not within the power of the superior courts at the time of Confed75
eration and therefore the transfer of power was held valid.1
Using this analysis it could be argued that Chapter 19 of NAFTA
also forms part of a novel jurisdiction, as there was no antidumping or
countervailing duty laws in Canada at the time of Confederation. It was
not until 1904 that Canada amended its Customs Tariff Act 176 to provide for antidumping duties, making it the first country to establish
such a regime. 177 A related argument that can be made is that had the
drafters of the BNA Act thought about international trade disputes in
1867, they would have created Binational tribunals rather than giving
the power to the Section 96 courts. Some evidence for this assertion can
be found in the International Joint Commission (IJC) created under the
1909 Boundary Waters Treaty between Canada and the United
States.178
However, it could also be argued that there is nothing novel about
judicial review, a power that was exclusively in the hands of Section 96
courts at the time of Confederation. 179 In Reference re Young Offenders
Act, the tribunal's power of contempt was one small part of its overall
function to provide a different scheme of criminal justice for youth offenders. By contrast, the primary function of the Binational Panel is judicial review. Therefore, it can be argued that Chapter 19 does not form
part of a novel jurisdiction, and as such, the analysis must continue.
c.

Judicial Function

In discussing the judicial function part of the Section 96 test, the
Court in Residential Tenancies wrote:
... the hallmark of judicial power is a lis between parties in which a tribunal is called upon to apply a recognized body of rules in a manner consistent with fairness
174. Id. at 269-72.
175. Id. at 271.
176. Act to Amend Customs Tariff 1897, S.C., ch.11, (1904) (Can).
177. See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE, 101 (1995).
178. See THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION SEVENTY YEARS ON, (R. Spencer, et

al. eds., 1981); S. Wex, Boundary Waters Treaty, Article VIII: The Legal Status of the InternationalJoint Commission under Internationaland Municipal Law, XVI Can. Y.B.
Int'l. L., 276 (1978).
179. T.A. Cromwell, supra note 83, at 1032.
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and impartiality. The adjudication deals primarily with
the rights of the parties to the dispute, rather than considerations
of the collective good of the community as a
80
whole.
The exercise of judicial review by Chapter 19 Binational Panels is
clearly a judicial function. Some authors have tried to characterize the
Chapter 19 Panels as arbitration boards and not super-national tribunals in order to ensure that these Panels are not prevented from settling disputes under the Mexican constitution. i81 In light of their procedures and functions outlined above, this argument is not convincing.
d.

Institutional Setting

It is a long established principle of Canadian constitutional law
that the constitutionality of legislation is to be determined by its substantial essence rather than by its minor or incidental characteristics.1 82 For this part of the Residential Tenancies test, court must examine the features of the scheme that have been attacked in the context
of the overall institutional setting.
With Chapter 19, the primary function of the tribunal is judicial
review. It would seem that the institutional setting therefore leads to
the conclusion that the Binational Panel process is unconstitutional.
The minority's judgment in MacMillan, highlights the difficulties the
Binational Panel system will face in trying to meet the "institutional
setting" test:
The Residential Tenancies test is based on the premise
that any judicial power can be transferred from a s. 96
court to an inferior tribunal, provided that the power is
ancillary to the tribunal's larger mandate. Shadow
courts, devoted exclusively or primarily to rendering
judgments which s. 96 courts have traditionally rendered, are forbidden. 8 3
Like the Young Offenders Act case, one could argue that the Chapter 19 Panels form part of international agreement so they are ancillary
to the NAFTA as a whole. But that is not the test. The requirement is
that the judicial function is only a small part of the tribunal's mandate. 8 4 Here it is virtually the tribunal's entire mandate, as was the
case in Residential Tenancies.
Therefore it would seem that the NAFTA Binational Review Panels
180. Re Residential Tenancies Act [1981] 1 S.C.R. at 743.
181. See Luis Manuel Perez de Acha, BinationalPanels:A Conflict of Idiosyncrasies, 3
Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 431, 433.
182. PETER W. HOGG, supra note 74, at 377-79.
183. See Madam Justice McLachlin in MacMillan Bloedel v. Simpson [1995] 4 S.C.R.
70.
184. Re Residential Tenancies Act [1981] 1 S.C.R. at 736.
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may indeed violate Section 96 by conferring judicial power on an inferior tribunal. The best argument against this position is that such a
conferral is not unconstitutional because the jurisdiction over antidumping disputes is novel. In any event, as the next section illustrates,
it is the removal of judicial review power from the superior courts that
is the most constitutionally indefensible aspect of NAFTA's Chapter 19
Panels.
B.

Is the Removal of jurisdictionfrom Section 96 Courts
Unconstitutional?

In order to answer this question it is first necessary to determine
whether judicial review is one of the "core functions" of the Section 96
courts. In Crevier v. A.G. Quebec, 85 the Supreme Court held that judicial review of administrative decisions was part of the essential functions of the Section 96 courts and could not be exercised by another tribunal.18 6 Chief Justice Laskin wrote for a unanimous Court: "I can
think of nothing that is more the hallmark of a superior court than the
vesting of power in a provincial statutory tribunal to determine the
187
limits of its jurisdiction without appeal or other review."
In Crevier, the Profession Code of Quebec governed several professional corporations in that province. 188 It required each corporation to
establish a Discipline Committee to deal with allegations of misconduct.18 9 Upon a finding of guilt, the Committee had the power to impose
a broad range of sanctions. 190 Two members of a professional corporation were convicted by the Discipline Committee and appealed that decision to the Professions Tribunal.19 ' The Tribunal quashed the conviction on the basis that the Discipline Committee had exceeded its
authority. 192 The complainants then brought a writ before a Quebec Superior Court challenging the constitutionality of the Tribunal. That
court found that the Tribunal had wide powers to confirm, alter or
quash any decision of the Discipline Committee, and was able to make
almost any determination of law, fact or jurisdiction. The Quebec Superior Court concluded that the Tribunal's powers were such as to offend
Section 96 of the Constitution. 193 The Supreme Court of Canada agreed,
holding that an attempt to insulate a statutory tribunal from any review of its adjudicative functions is unconstitutional under Section

185. Crevier v. Attorney Gen. Que. [19811 2 S.C.R. 220 (Can.).

186. Id. at 237-39.
187. Id. at 237.
188. Id. at 222.

189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Crevier [19811 2 S.C.R. at 223.

192. Id.
193. Id.
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96.194 A statutory tribunal may not, in the face of Section 96, determine
the limits of its own jurisdiction without appeal or review. 195
Apparently a significant factor in the Court's decision was the fact
that the sole function of the Tribunal was to hear appeals, 196 as opposed
to exercising final appellate authority as part of an institutional arrangement by way of a regulatory scheme. Chief Justice Laskin wrote:
"The Professions Tribunal is not so much integrated into any scheme as
it is sitting on top of the various schemes and with an authority detached from them .... "197
The Court cited Residential Tenancies with approval holding that a
scheme will be invalid "when the adjudicative function is the sole or
central function of the tribunal so that the tribunal can be said to be op198
erating like a section 96 court."'
In Attorney General v. Farrah,199 the Quebec provincial Legislature
established a statutory tribunal of appeal with jurisdiction, to the exclusion of any other court, to hear and dispose of an appeal on any question of law. 20 0 This had the effect of transferring the supervisory jurisdiction of the Quebec Superior Court to the Tribunal, which the
Supreme Court of Canada ruled was beyond the power of the provincial
legislature by virtue of Section 96. Commenting on Farrah,the Court
in Crevier wrote:
In short, what the Farrahcase decided was that to give
a provincially-constituted statutory tribunal a jurisdiction in appeal on questions of law without limitation,
and to reinforce this appellate authority by excluding
any supervisory recourse to the 201
Quebec Superior Court,
was to create a Section 96 court.
Applying these cases to the NAFTA Binational Panels, it would
seem that there is little doubt they are unconstitutional. Like the tribunal in Crevier, they sit on top of the Canadian antidumping and countervailing duty regime. Their primary purpose is judicial review. It
could be argued that their judicial review function is an ancillary part
of their role of reviewing legislation, however, it is far more likely the
case that this supervisory role over legislation is incidental to its dispute settlement function.
The only plausible retort would be that judicial review is not part of

194. Id. at 234.
195. Id. at 238.
196. Crevier [1981] 2 S.C.R. at 233.

197. Id.
198.
(Can.)).
199.
200.
201.

Id. at 233 (citing Tomko v. Labour Relations Bd. (N.S.) [1977] 1 S.C.R. 112
Attorney Gen. Que. v. Farrah, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 638 (Can.).
Id. at 641-42.
Crevier, [19811 2 S.C.R. at 238.
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the "core functions" of Section 96 courts and therefore the Binational
Panels are not unconstitutional. There is some support for this position
in the academic literature. Speaking about the English superior courts,
I.H. Jacob wrote: "The jurisdiction of the High Court to review the decisions of an inferior court cannot, however, nowadays be said to be part
of its inherent jurisdiction, for this jurisdiction is exercised by virtue of
202
prerogative orders."
Whether Justice Lamer's "core functions" of the provincial superior
courts are co-extensive with Jacob's "inherent jurisdiction" is unclear.
In Residential Tenancies (N.S. 1992), Chief Justice Lamer, writing for
the minority, concluded that jurisdiction over residential tenancy disputes was not part of the "core" jurisdiction protected by Section 96.203
Justice Lamer held that core jurisdiction is very narrow and includes
"only critically important jurisdictions which are essential to the existence of a superior court ...and to the preservation of its foundational
role within [the Canadian] legal system." 20 4 Perhaps this definition is so
narrow that it excludes judicial review. However, MacMillan itself suggests that judicial review would be a "core function."
In upholding the constitutionality of the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Youth Courts to try minors for contempt, the dissenting judges in
MacMillan wrote: "[T]ransfers of s. 96 jurisdiction to inferior tribunals
have not ousted the power of the superior courts, but merely elevated it
one remove. Administrative tribunals deal with the factual minutiae of
multitudinous disputes; the superior courts ensure that the law is fol205
lowed and fair process maintained."
This would suggest that with respect to the constitutionality of
Chapter 19 of NAFTA, even the minority in MacMillan would be concerned over Chapter 19 since it completely ousts the judicial review
power of the superior courts in antidumping and subsidy cases.
VI. CONCLUSION

It is unlikely the Supreme Court of Canada will strike down the
legislation that implements Chapter 19 of NAFTA as unconstitutional,
as it is well aware that the results would be devastating for Canada and
the NAFTA system. The Chapter 19 process is an essential part of the
free trade regime between Canada and the United States and its demise might spell the end of the entire NAFTA project. 206 If Canada

202. I. H. Jacob, The Inherent Jurisdictionof the Court, 23 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 23,
49 (1970).
203. Reference re Amendments to the Residential Tenancies Act (N.S. 1992), [1996] 1
S.C.R. 186, 224, 1 56 (Can.).

204. Id.
205. MacMillan Bloedel [1995] 4 S.C.R. 1 83.
206. A U.S. official described Chapter 19 as the linchpin of the FTA. See Remarks by
John 0. McGinnis, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, United States-CanadaFree Trade
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could not carry out its international responsibilities under Chapter 19,
it would likely be in fundamental breach of its treaty obligations and
either the United States or Mexico could legally withdraw from NAFTA
under Article 2205. Even a decision that the Binational Panels were
constitutional so long as they did not remove the power of judicial review from the superior courts would be a disaster for Canada-U.S. trade
relations.
Instead, the Court will likely utilize one of the arguments outlined
above to find that Chapter 19 is either outside the scope of the Section
96 jurisprudence or that it does not violate that section. This can be
achieved by finding that the Panels have a novel jurisdiction exercised
by no court at the time of confederation, that they are not "judicial" in
nature or they are an ancillary part of the entire NAFTA scheme. A
court upholding NAFTA's constitutionality would also have to decide
that judicial review is not a "core function" of the superior courts or that
the "core function" test does not apply to the Federal Courts. All of
these arguments are weak, but plausible. However, such judicial acrobatics will only create more confusion in Canadian constitutional law
while postponing the real issue for another day. Canada, including the
courts, the government and the people, must address the looming confrontations between their constitution and the global economic order an issue of critical importance that has thus far been ignored.
Chapter 19 is not the only part of NAFTA that raises constitutional
problems for Canada. The Canadian Government can bind the country
to international obligations under international law. However, international treaties are not self-executing in Canada and do not automatically become Canadian law upon accession. Instead, as a result of the
principle of parliamentary supremacy, if the implementation of a treaty
requires changes to Canadian law, legislation is necessary. However,
the constitutional power to legislate is divided between the federal and
provincial governments. The federal Government's trade and commerce
power enables Ottawa to regulate interprovincial and international
trade, whereas the provincial governments have the power to regulate
intra-provincial trade. There is no supremacy clause like there is in the
U.S. Constitution that would similarly bind the provinces to the accord.
As international trade agreements shift their focus from tariff to
non-tariff barriers, the role of Canadian provinces has increased in the
international sphere because of their constitutional jurisdiction over
services, labor and investment. 207 These activities fall under provincial
jurisdiction that can resist Parliamentary interference, even to implement international law obligations. 208 In the 1937 Labour Conventions
Agreement: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. On the Judiciaryon the Constitutionality of
Establishinga BinationalPanel to Resolve Disputes in Antidumping and Countervailing
Duty Cases, 100 th Cong., 2d, Sess. 96 (1988).
207. Constitution Act, 1867, R.S.C., App. No. 5 § 92 (1985) (Can.).

208. James P. Mcilroy, NAFiTA and the CanadianProvinces: Two Ships Passingin the

1998

CANADIAN CONSTITUTION

case 209 , the Privy Council, struck down legislation enacted by the federal Government pursuant to its obligations under an ILO convention
on constitutional grounds. 210 It held that there was no general federal
power in Canada to implement international treaties. Instead, Canadian courts are to look at the substantive subject matter of the implementing legislation. 21' If that legislation deals with a matter allocated
to the federal Parliament, then Ottawa had the power to implement the
treaty. 212 If however, the subject matter is allocated to the provincial
legislatures, then Ottawa could not enact treaty-implementing legisla213
tion.
With the rising importance of international trade agreements,
Canada may soon not be able to afford to have its federal Government
without the power to implement legislation in order to comply with international trade obligations when such obligations relate to matters
within the provincial jurisdiction. In time, Canada's trading partners
may become reluctant to enter agreements With Canada if it cannot
guarantee provincial compliance. This potential dilemma is not without
possible remedies. The first is obtaining provincial approval before negotiating any international agreement. However this would substantially impede Canada's ability to negotiate and is therefore undesirable.
Moreover, it will also lead to provinces withholding their approval in
the hopes of gaining some benefit from the federal Government. The
second solution is to have the Supreme Court rehear the issue. It is
likely that the Supreme Court would depart from the 1937 Labour Conventions case if given the opportunity to do so. That case was decided
more than sixty years ago, by the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council at a time when international treaties did not have the same
importance to domestic economics as they do now. The third possibility
is a constitutional amendment, expressly granting Parliament the
power to implement treaties, regardless of their subject-matter, through
legislation that bind the provinces. Which of these three approaches is
most appropriate is beyond the scope of this paper but it is another one
of the issues Canada must face due to its economic integration through
NAFTA.
The dubious constitutionality of the NAFTA Chapter 19 binational
tribunals can be resolved through adept judicial maneuvering if re-

Night?, 23 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 431, 433 (1997).
209. Attorney Gen. Can. v. Attorney Gen. Ont. (1937] 1 D.L.R. 673, (Labour
Conventions). Until 1949, Canada's highest court was the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council (J.C.P.C.), which is in fact the House of Lords under another name convened for
the purpose of hearing and determining matters originating outside the United Kingdom

in the former British Empire. Canada abolished appeals to the J.C.P.C. in 1949, at which
time the Supreme Court of Canada became Canada's highest court.
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quired. But it forms part of the larger debate that is best not decided by
the courts alone. The questions Canada must face as a nation are: how
much sovereignty is it willing to relinquish to the international system
in the hopes of economic benefit and when is loss of Canadian identity
or culture too high a price to pay?
Chapter 19 of NAFTA is probably not a real threat to Canadian
sovereignty and the benefits of free trade under NAFTA surely outweigh the small infringement on the jurisdiction of the Canadian superior courts. However, as NAFTA widens in scope and deepens in commitments, similar issues will arise where the losses and gains may be
more evenly balanced. It is important for Canada to face the conflict between free trade and national sovereignty while there is adequate time
for significant consultation, debate and reflection. Soon court challenges or international pressure may make a thoroughly considered decision on these issues much more difficult.

